Author：区块律动

This proposal is essentially a stage victory for Aave DAO governance.

Last December, a truly independent agent, @EzR3aL, raised questions about revenue attribution, sparking a series of discussions within the community regarding revenue alignment mechanisms, governance transparency, and the boundaries of Aave Labs' relationship with the protocol. To date, Aave Labs' response includes: transferring 100% of Aave-branded product revenue to the DAO treasury, confirming V4 as the unified technological foundation, and establishing a foundation to hold the brand and IP.

These changes did not occur naturally, but were the result of sustained pressure from governance. In other words, they demonstrate the effectiveness of governance.

The direction is correct. I have long publicly advocated for this token-centric alignment of interests. The goal is sound, but the current plan still needs clarification and revision at the implementation level. Before the vote, the community needs to fully understand the key details.

First, carefully read the "Detailed Rules".

The core statement of the proposal is: "100% of the revenue from Aave branded products belongs to the DAO." This is a clear and positive commitment, and it proves that decentralized governance can produce real results. However, the prerequisite for governance is a rigorous review of the terms.

The definition of "100% income" should not be in the hands of Labs.

In the proposal text, "revenue" is defined as: total product revenue, minus partner revenue sharing, revenue returns, subsidies, and additional direct user incentives.

The problem is that all of the above deductions are unilaterally determined by Aave Labs: there is no independent audit, no clear upper limit, and no prior or subsequent approval from the DAO.

The proposal also states that Aave Labs reserves the right to decide whether to use a portion of product cash flow (such as vault revenue) directly for user incentives.

"100% income" is a highly symbolic statement, but the definition of income must be in the hands of the DAO, not by the party receiving the funds.

Only by introducing independent third-party audits and setting a DAO-approved cap mechanism for discretionary deductions can this commitment be transformed from a slogan into an enforceable and verifiable institutional arrangement.

This is an adjustment with minimal technical aspects but significant institutional implications.

The current size of the national treasury is insufficient to support a single disbursement of such a volume.

As of now, the Aave DAO treasury holds approximately $160.9 million, of which about $44.8 million decreased last month due to market volatility. In terms of asset structure, approximately $100.6 million consists of non-AAVE assets, and $60.2 million is in AAVE tokens.

This proposal requests: $42.5 million in stablecoins ($25 million main grant + $17.5 million milestone grant); 75,000 AAVE tokens.

Stablecoins alone account for 42% of the DAO's non-AAVE reserves; the total requested amount is approximately US$50.7 million, equivalent to 31.5% of the entire national treasury.

This is a highly concentrated funding request directed at a single service provider and completed through a single vote. No transfer of funds or tokens should occur without enforceable constraints and transparent disclosure.

Aave's cash flow basis comes from V3.

Aave V3 currently generates over $100 million in annualized protocol revenue annually, making it one of the most mature and stable lending infrastructures in the DeFi space.

Looking back, over 95% of Aave DAO's cumulative revenue has come from V3 and its predecessors.

However, the proposal positions V3 as "near the limits of the architecture" and pushes for V4 as the overall alternative at the governance level. Meanwhile, the maintenance plan explicitly states that if the framework is adopted, pausing the addition of new features to V3 is reasonable.

V4 may represent the long-term direction, but we must face the fact that it is currently still in the testnet phase, with only partial audits completed and no actual revenue generated yet.

A more prudent approach would be a two-pronged approach: while continuing to protect V3, a $100 million annual cash flow engine, accelerate the independent validation of V4.

Combining "confirming agreements that have not yet been launched" and "freezing mature revenue sources" into a single vote is clearly too radical.

The governance confirmation of V4 should be completed through an independent proposal, based on its own maturity and mainnet launch status.

Voting items should not be forcibly bundled together.

The FAQ states that splitting related matters into separate votes may lead to fragmented plans that are difficult to implement.

However, in terms of governance substance, this is a package of four independent decisions: income alignment mechanism; V4 governance confirmation; foundation establishment; and a funding request of over $50 million.

Their risk attributes and consensus bases are not the same.

There is a broad consensus in the community on income alignment; there may also be support for the direction of V4 and the foundation; however, there are still significant differences on the size, pace and constraints of the funding.

Bundled voting implies "total acceptance or total rejection." If each part is valid on its own, the community should be allowed to express its opinion and make amendments separately.

The 75,000 AAVE tokens essentially represent a transfer of governance power.

At the current price of approximately $109, 75,000 AAVE tokens would be worth about $8.2 million, equivalent to 13.6% of the DAO's current AAVE holdings (approximately 550,000 tokens).

The AAVE token itself represents voting rights.

Previously, I published an on-chain analysis showing that wallets associated with Aave Labs infrastructure participated in a vote against the "mandatory disclosure" proposal (which requires wallets to disclose information and avoid conflicts of interest). The vote is still ongoing, and the supporters are at a disadvantage.

Against this backdrop, the proposal to transfer another 75,000 AAVE tokens to a governance entity whose holdings have not yet been disclosed clearly indicates an information asymmetry.

Before further transferring governance power, the DAO needs to fully understand the voting influence already held by the receiving party.

What I support, and what I reserve.

I support the overall direction of this proposal: revenue alignment is correct; it is reasonable for the brand and IP to be held by the foundation; V4 has a logical basis as a long-term technology path; and the DAO should face the fact that continuous and rational governance intervention is producing real results.

However, direction is not the same as execution, and Temp Check should not be regarded as an authorization.

Before that, four things should be done.

I suggest completing the following steps before proceeding with any substantial funding:

Split voting

Revenue alignment, V4 confirmation, foundation establishment, and funding requests should be considered as separate proposals.

Ensure the foundation's true independence

Prior to any transfer of funds, an independent foundation holding all Aave IP, trademarks, and brand rights should have been established and verified.The so-called "independence" should be reflected in the board structure and governance mechanism, rather than just at the level of legal documents.

Complete wallet and governance disclosure

Any entity that accepts DAO funds and AAVE tokens should disclose all wallets it directly or indirectly controls. This standard should apply equally to all service providers.

Introduce an independent income verification mechanism

The so-called "100% revenue" should be defined and verified by an independent auditing firm, and the relevant deductions should be capped or approved by the DAO.

These requirements are not intended to negate the proposal, but rather to ensure its feasibility and credibility. If these arrangements were already in the planning stages, explicitly including them in the Temp Check will only enhance community confidence.

Only when these conditions are met can the DAO rationally evaluate funding plans under transparent and verifiable conditions.

This is a day to celebrate Aave governance. The community pushed for alignment, and it was met with a positive response.

The next step is to ensure that this response is genuine, actionable, and fair to all token holders.